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Research in the 1970s based on observational data provided evidence consistent with 
predictions from economic theory that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to 
involuntarily jobless workers prolongs unemployment. However, some scholars also reported 
estimates that the additional time spent in subsidized job search was productive. That is, UI 
receipt tended to raise reemployment wages after work search among the unemployed.  A series 
of field experiments in the 1980s investigated positive incentives to overcome the work 
disincentive effects of UI.  These were followed by experiments in the 1990s that evaluated the 
effects of restrictions on UI eligibility through stronger work search requirements and alternative 
uses of UI.  The new century has seen some related field experiments in employment policy, and 
reexamination of the earlier experimental results.  This paper reviews the experimental evidence 
and considers it in the context of the current federal-state UI system. 
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Evaluating Public Employment Programs with Field Experiments: A Survey of American 
Evidence 
 
 Policies to support labor markets in the United States are mainly initiatives of the federal 
government.  Historically, states and localities have been reluctant to act independently in 
employment policy for fear of competitively disadvantaging resident industries with added costs.  
Federal leadership has permitted individual states to address important labor market problems 
with a diminished risk of job loss.  
 
 The Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933 established the U.S. Employment Service (ES), the 
Social Security Act of 1935 established the federal-state system of unemployment insurance 
(UI), and Depression-era public works programs enacted by the Works Progress Administration 
put millions of men to work.  These three New Deal programs signaled the start of federal 
employment policies, which have been refined over the years based on program experience in 
states and local areas.  Public administration relies on best practice as a guide.  Modern public 
management looks to program evaluation as a guide to improve policy.  In the area of 
employment policy, since the 1980s the states have truly served as laboratories of democracy.  
States have tested promising policy improvements for employment programs by applying 
classical experimental methods with randomized controlled trials on large samples of program-
eligible persons.   
 
 This paper summarizes the knowledge accumulated from a wide variety of field 
experiments conducted on elements of U.S. employment programs over the past 40 years.  To set 
the context for this discussion, the next section briefly considers the advantages and 
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disadvantages of the experimental approach.  The following four sections provide summaries of 
the research on employment programs and incentives tried by the ES-UI partnership to promote 
return to work by job-ready persons with recent labor market experience: cash reemployment 
bonuses, job search assistance (JSA) and the UI work test, targeted JSA, and employer 
incentives.  The final section offers a summary and some comments on the relevance of lessons 
for the UI system today from these field experiments.  
 
The Appeal of Field Experiments 
 
 Classically designed field experiments involving randomized controlled trials (RCT) are 
the gold standard for estimating the impact of changes to public programs.  If random assignment 
is achieved, modeling of behavior and complex econometric methods are not needed to obtain 
reliable program impact estimates.1  With large samples randomly assigned to treatment and 
control groups, observable and unobservable characteristics of the two groups should not differ 
on average, so any difference in outcomes can be attributed to the program change.  Average 
program impacts can be measured as the simple difference between the means of the samples of 
program participants and of control group members on outcomes of interest.  Since this process 
is easy to understand, impact estimates computed in this way can be influential for public policy. 
 
 When there is nonrandom assignment to either a program participant group or the 
comparison group, then proper estimation of program impacts requires statistical methods of 
                                                 
1
 Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999) enumerate the assumptions implicit in such a view of random-assignment 
field experiments as a means for model-free impact estimation.  
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correction to offset potential sample selection bias.  A commonly used approach, which could be 
called “belt and suspenders,” is to compute mean differences in regression models, including 
observable characteristics to correct for sample differences.2 However, this is often not sufficient 
to correct for biases due to unobservable differences between groups.  A popular solution to this 
problem was proposed by Heckman (1976), who asserted that sample selection could be 
characterized as an unobservable variable that distinguishes program participants from 
nonparticipants.  Other approaches involve strategically selecting a comparison group by 
matching characteristics of program participants with nonparticipants who appear to be 
otherwise similar.  Such matching may be done either on a set of characteristics or on a single 
summary measure of several characteristics known as a propensity score (Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith 1999).  Recent research has exploited naturally occurring events that cannot be 
manipulated by participants and lead to discontinuities in outcomes of interest (Lee and Lemieux 
2010).  These regression discontinuity methods are now regarded as second best to the gold 
standard of RCT in field experiments.  Because of the focus on a particular discontinuity, the 
RCT methods usually estimate local average treatment effects.   
 
 Policy decisions concerning questions of whether to continue, expand, reduce, or cancel 
government employment programs require information about the net benefits of government 
spending.  Cost-benefit analysis requires measurement of net impacts.  Net impact evaluations 
are not without potential problems, even if the evaluation is done under the ideal conditions of a 
field experiment.  The first type of potential pitfall threatens the internal validity of the 
experiment.  Such problems include errors in random assignment to treatment and control 
                                                 
2
 The term “belt and suspenders” refers to redundant systems that afford mutual backup in case one fails. 
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groups, as well as inconsistent experimental conditions.  The first of these can lead to 
heterogeneity in characteristics between treatment and control groups.  The second means that 
the same treatment conditions were not successfully repeated in all cases.  Even when 
randomization is successful, problems can result from dropout bias, wherein a customer assigned 
to an experimental treatment did not in fact receive the service. The logical complement to 
dropout bias is called substitution bias, wherein a control group member actually receives the 
treatment, although this might not be observed (Heckman et al. 2000).  
 
 The second group of evaluation pitfalls concern external validity.  These issues affect the 
ability to transfer impact estimates from the evaluation context to the real-world policy context.  
Time horizon effects can occur when treatment subjects understand that an experimental service 
is only temporary rather than permanent.  Learning effects can take place within a community 
during the course of an evaluation, causing later enrollees to act differently from those enrolled 
around the time the experiment begins.  Entry effects not observed during an evaluation can 
emerge when an appealing service becomes generally available to a population of potential 
customers, thereby increasing program take-up and system costs.  Hawthorne effects are 
responses to treatments that are not due to the content of service, but simply to special attention 
being paid to participants.3  Displacement effects, which may be the most critical external 
                                                 
3
 A Hawthorne effect is the initial improvement in a process of production caused by the obtrusive observation of 
that process.  The effect was first noticed in the Hawthorne Works plant of the Western Electric Company in Cicero, 
Illinois, during studies of workplace behavior in the 1920s and ’30s.  Production increased not as a consequence of 
actual changes in working conditions introduced by the plant’s management, but because management demonstrated 
interest in such improvements.  A reexamination of the Hawthorne data has called into question whether such an 
effect actually occurred during the original studies (Jones 1992). 
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validity concern, occur when treatment-assigned subjects improve their outcomes at the expense 
of others in the community who are not part of the evaluation sample.4   
 
 As Zvi Griliches said, “If the data were perfect, collected from well-designed randomized 
experiments, there would be hardly room for a separate field of econometrics” (Orr 1999, p. 
187). The following review mentions few exceptions to the classical assumptions of 
experimental design and does not delve into any corrections that might have been done before 
reporting final program impact estimates. The focus here is on average program effects.  That is, 
it focuses on the effect of treatment upon the treated, assuming good experimental designs were 




 Economic theory suggests that paying unemployment insurance (UI) benefits to 
involuntarily jobless workers prolongs unemployment. The static neoclassical theory of choice 
by a consumer-worker under certainty and the dynamic theory of job search under uncertainty 
both suggest that the presence of UI will lengthen unemployment durations beyond what they 
would be otherwise (Cox and Oaxaca 1989; Krueger and Meyer 2002).  A utility-maximizing 
consumer-worker considering reemployment while receiving UI will choose to supply less labor 
because the opportunity cost of leisure is lower than in the absence of UI.  An unemployed job 
                                                 
4
 This discussion of impact estimation and most of the studies reviewed here focus on partial equilibrium effects of 
interventions.  That is, they assume away external validity issues that include general equilibrium effects such as 
entry and displacement effects.  Some evaluations have directly measured these effects (Davidson and Woodbury 
1993).   
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seeker facing uncertain draws from wage-offer distribution will have a higher reservation wage 
while receiving UI than in the absence of jobless compensation.  
 
 A series of papers in the 1970s provided empirical evidence of a UI work disincentive.  
Feldstein (1974) cites extremely high wage replacement rates for UI in some states, compounded 
by the tax exempt status of UI payments. He argues that moral hazard from this social insurance 
induced beneficiaries to exaggerate the involuntary nature of their joblessness so as to prolong 
unemployment.5  Using estimating equations derived from a job search model and data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimate that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the UI wage replacement ratio would increase unemployment durations by 1.5 weeks.  
They also report evidence that such an extended job search is productive, in that it increases 
reemployment wages by more than 7 percent.  Around the same time, Classen (1977) reports 
similar empirical evidence, based on data from Arizona and Pennsylvania, that higher UI 
benefits increased the duration of unemployment, but she does not find evidence of higher 
reemployment wages after prolonged job search.6  However, recent research by Nekoei (2014), 
using administrative data from Austria and a regression discontinuity design, estimates that a 
nine-week extension of UI eligibility increases the average reemployment wage by 0.5 percent. 
 
 The payment of UI during times of involuntary unemployment is an important part of the 
social safety net, and the automatic countercyclical role of UI is important to the macro 
economy. For these reasons, the evidence of work disincentive effects from paying UI benefits 
                                                 
5
 Solon (1985) estimated that the 1979 federal tax reform that made UI benefits taxable shortened average insured 
unemployment durations by about one week.   
6
 Decker (1997, pp. 293–294) reported the range of published estimates to be between 0.3 and 1.5 weeks’ longer 
duration of UI receipt for a 10 percentage point increase in the UI replacement rate.   
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led to a search for ways to improve reemployment incentives in the system.7  A series of field 
experiments was conducted to evaluate positive reemployment incentives in UI.  Between 1984 
and 1989, four reemployment bonus experiments targeted at UI recipients were conducted in the 
United States.  These experiments provided various levels of lump-sum payments to UI 
recipients who took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks of their benefit application and held 
those jobs for at least three to four months.  The purpose of these interventions was to learn more 
about the behavioral response of UI recipients to changes in the UI program.  Experiments that 
offered reemployment bonuses were designed to find an incentive that would speed the return to 
work in a manner that would benefit employees, employers, and the government, and would be 
cost effective.  UI claimants would be better off if they returned to work sooner and found jobs 
that were similar and paid similar wages to the jobs that they would take in the absence of a 
bonus offer.  Employers would be better off if they had lower UI payroll taxes.  The government 
would be better off if the cost of the bonus were offset by a decrease in UI benefit payments to 
unemployed workers and an increase in income and other tax contributions by workers during 
their longer period of employment.  
 
Illinois UI Incentive Experiment 
 
 The first bonus experiment was conducted in Illinois during 1984–1985 and was 
sponsored by the Illinois Department of Employment Security.  Its goal was to examine the 
theoretical and empirical economic implications of a reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants 
and the potential for developing a cost-effective bonus program.  The Illinois design provided a 
                                                 
7
 Oaxaca and Taylor (1986) estimate the macro stabilizing effects of UI on local economies.   
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$500 bonus amount, equivalent to about four weeks of UI benefit payments—i.e., four times the 
UI weekly benefit amount (WBA).  To collect a bonus payment, treatment group members 
needed to become reemployed within 11 weeks of filing their UI claims (Table 1 summarizes the 
design and impact estimates for the reemployment bonus experiments).    
 
 The estimated impact of the Illinois reemployment bonus offer to UI claimants was a 
reduction in the duration of UI-compensated unemployment by 1.15 weeks (Woodbury and 
Spiegelman 1987).  This reduction was so great that the reemployment bonus was cost-effective 
to the UI Trust Fund, generating a benefit-cost ratio of 2.32.  At the same time, participants 
suffered no reduction in postunemployment wages, which indicates that the bonus offer did not 
reduce job quality. 
 
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment 
 
 Independent of the Illinois experiment, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) 
sponsored a New Jersey UI experiment that included a reemployment bonus treatment group. 
This project was designed and became operational in 1985 and 1986, before the results from the 
Illinois experiment became available.   As such, the New Jersey experiment was not designed to 
replicate or validate the Illinois experiment.   The New Jersey bonus offer was designed so that 
the amount of the offer was tied to a claimant’s remaining UI benefit entitlement. Thus, the 
amount paid was larger in cases of more rapid reemployment.  The initial bonus offer was one-
half of the claimant’s remaining entitlement at the time of the offer.  This offer amount remained 
constant for the first two full weeks after the initial offer.  Thereafter, the amount of the bonus 
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offer declined by 10 percent of the original amount per week, falling to zero by the end of the 
eleventh full week of the bonus offer.  Initial bonus offers in New Jersey averaged $1,644, which 
was about nine times the UI weekly benefit amount.  
 
 The evaluation of the New Jersey experiment suggested that the reemployment bonus, as 
it was implemented in New Jersey, generated modest savings in UI.  Since the cost of offering 
and paying the bonuses exceeded the modest UI savings, the New Jersey bonus was not cost 
effective from the perspective of the UI system. 
 
Pennsylvania and Washington Reemployment Bonus Experiments 
 
 In 1987, with the evaluation of the Illinois experiment completed and the New Jersey 
experiment operations over, USDOL sponsored two additional reemployment bonus 
experiments.  In contrast to the Illinois experiment, these later trials generated much more 
modest results.  In the Pennsylvania and Washington experiments, the bonus offers were set as 
multiples of the worker’s weekly benefit level.  This design was adopted because in the Illinois 
experiment, claimants receiving less than the UI maximum weekly benefit responded more 
strongly to bonus offers than those constrained by the maximum (O’Leary, Spiegelman, and 
Kline 1995).  The Pennsylvania and Washington experiments tested benefit levels that bracketed 
the Illinois bonus amount (4 ×WBA) and tested qualifications both similar to the earlier offers 




 The resulting designs provided for four treatment groups in Pennsylvania and six in 
Washington (Table 1).  Each treatment specified a bonus level (high and low in Pennsylvania; 
high, medium, and low in Washington) and a qualification period or duration of the bonus offer 
(short and long in both states).  The reemployment period of four months was the same for all 
treatments.  While half of the 10 treatments in Pennsylvania and Washington were cost effective 
to claimants, society, and the government sector as a whole, only two of the treatments were cost 
effective for the UI system (Decker and O’Leary 1995).  
 
 The relatively weak response to the bonus offers in Pennsylvania and Washington led to a 
reexamination of the powerful Illinois results.  It was discovered that within the designed 
experiment, a second experiment had unintentionally taken place.  In 1984, as Illinois was 
recovering from a major recession, the availability of Federal Supplemental Compensation (FSC) 
was terminated.  This resulted in about half of the claimants studied having 38 weeks of UI 
benefit eligibility, with the remainder being eligible for only 26 weeks of regular UI benefits.  It 
turns out that the mean bonus response of −1.15 weeks in Illinois was made up of a response of 
−1.78 weeks for those eligible for FSC and −0.54 weeks for those not eligible (Davidson and 
Woodbury 1991).  The mean response of −0.54 for the non-FSC sample in Illinois is close to the 
response observed in Pennsylvania and Washington, where the entitled duration of benefits was 
also similar. 
 
 Among the individual treatments, the impact on weeks of UI benefits ranged from −0.05 
for the offer in Washington involving a low bonus amount and a short qualification period to 
−1.78 for the bonus offer to FSC-eligible claimants in Illinois.  Impacts for Pennsylvania tended 
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to fall between those for Illinois and Washington.  Overall, a cash bonus can be expected to 
modestly shorten spells of insured unemployment—the mean effect of the offers made in the 
three states yielded about a one-half week’s reduction in UI benefits.   
 
 The degree of response to the bonus offer was also examined for important subgroups 
within the sample.  Results from Pennsylvania and Washington suggest that UI claimants in low 
unemployment areas and claimants whose prior employment was in manufacturing tended to 
respond more strongly to the bonus.  However, close inspection of subgroup results reveals one 
overarching finding:  there is no difference between any pair of subgroups shown that is both 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels and consistent across the three 
experiments.  The implication of this finding is quite striking—the reemployment bonus has a 
remarkably even impact on various subgroups of workers, whether delineated by gender, age, 
race, industrial sector of employment, level of local unemployment, or level of the weekly 
benefit amount. 
 
Pennsylvania and Washington Targeted Reemployment Bonuses 
 
 O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (2005) investigated whether targeting reemployment 
bonus offers to unemployment insurance (UI) claimants identified as most likely to exhaust 
benefits would reduce benefit payments.8  They showed that targeting bonus offers with profiling 
                                                 
8
Targeted reemployment bonuses were also tested in a field experiment (Wandner 2012) as part of personal 
reemployment accounts (PRAs).  However, the design of the bonus offers under PRAs was not similar to the earlier 
experiments, and the bonus take-up was low among UI beneficiaries who accepted a PRA offer.  Furthermore, 
across the seven states where targeted PRAs were tried, only 45 percent of PRA money was paid out in 
reemployment bonuses.  A larger share of PRA money was paid for supportive services (Kirby et al. 2008).   
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models similar to those in state Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) systems 
can improve cost effectiveness.9  However, estimated average benefit payments do not steadily 
decline as the eligibility screen for targeting is gradually tightened by the probability of UI 
exhaustion.  They find that narrow targeting is not optimal.  The best candidate to emerge is a 
low bonus amount with a long qualification period, targeted to the half of profiled claimants 
most likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement.   
 
 Two potential behavioral effects might reduce cost effectiveness for an operational 
program (Meyer 1995).  First, an actual bonus program could have a displacement effect.  
Displacement occurs if UI claimants who are offered a bonus increase their rate of reemployment 
at the expense of other job seekers not offered a bonus.  Second, there is also the risk that an 
operational bonus offer program could induce an entry effect.  That is, the availability of a 
reemployment bonus might result in a larger proportion of unemployed job seekers entering the 
UI system.   
 
 If entry and displacement effects are sizable, actual program cost effectiveness will be 
lowered.  However, targeting offers of a low bonus amount coupled with a long qualification 
period to only those most likely to exhaust UI should reduce both these risks.  Targeting would 
introduce uncertainty that a bonus offer would be forthcoming upon filing a UI claim, which 
should reduce the chance of a large entry effect.  Also, targeting should reduce any potential for 
displacement, since a smaller proportion of claimants would receive the bonus offer.10  
                                                 
9More on WPRS is provided below in the section on targeted job search assistance. 
10 Davidson and Woodbury (1993) estimate that a nontargeted bonus offer to all UI claimants could increase 
unemployment durations among those not eligible for UI by between 0.2 and 0.4 weeks.   
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The UI Work Test and Job Search Assistance  
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage replacement to the 
involuntarily unemployed.  Proper administration of this principle assures that UI is social 
insurance and not a dole.  Unemployment insurance eligibility rules require that beneficiaries are 
strongly attached to the labor force and temporarily jobless through no fault of their own.  To 
initially qualify for UI, a claimant must satisfy both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility 
requirements.  Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earnings.11  The 
nonmonetary eligibility rules specify that the job separation must be involuntary.  These rules 
prohibit quits and discharge for causes justifiable by an employer, such as frequent tardiness, 
unexplained absences, misconduct, or poor job performance.  To maintain continuing UI 
eligibility, beneficiaries also must be able, available, and actively seeking full-time work.  
Assessment of compliance with the UI work test is normally administered by the Employment 
Service (ES), which works in cooperation with state UI agencies. An influential audit of UI 
payment accuracy done for the U.S. Department of Labor reported that a large fraction of 
overpayments in the UI system were due to failure to satisfy work search requirements (Burgess 
and Kingston 1987).  This influential study spawned a series of evaluations of the UI work test 
and associated job search requirements. 
 
The UI work test normally involves beneficiaries certifying on their biweekly continued 
claim form that they have actively searched for work.  Most states require beneficiaries to name 
two or three specific employers contacted about work in the past two weeks.  Job search 
                                                 
11
 The UI base period is normally the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters before the date of 
claim for benefits. For claimants not eligible based on earnings in the standard base period, earnings in an alternate 




assistance (JSA) comprises a bundle of services available from the public labor exchange, which 
may include resume preparation assistance, job finding clubs, provision of specific labor market 
information, development of a job search plan, and orientation to self-service resources (job 
vacancy listings, resume preparation, word processor competency testing, and telephones for 
contacting employers).  In the evaluations of JSA that have been done, job search workshops are 
treated as a distinct service.  Evaluations of the UI work test and JSA overlap. 
 
 Four specific evaluations of JSA have been particularly influential in shaping public labor 
exchange policy.  The designs, samples, and findings from these studies are given in Table 2.  
All evaluations were done as field experiments involving random assignment.  Among other 
offerings of the public employment service, job referrals and placements have not applied an 
experimental design because of the untenable design requirement of withholding from the 
control group basic services having universal entitlement. Consequently, JSA evaluations have 
focused on UI claimants and have usually involved providing additional services.   
 
 It is well documented that in performing its income replacement function, UI acts as a 
disincentive to rapid return to work (Decker 1997).  The work test that links the UI and ES 
programs in the United States is an institutional mechanism for monitoring whether UI 
beneficiaries are available and actively seeking work.  The JSA evaluations have investigated 




Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment 
 
 The first field experiment addressing aspects of the UI work test in the United States 
began enrollment in February 1983 in Charleston, South Carolina (Corson, Long, and Nicholson 
1985).  Random assignment of 5,675 initial UI claimants to three treatment groups and a control 
group was completed in December 1983.  The experiment was designed to evaluate new 
procedures intended to improve the UI work test and enhance ES practices.  The three treatments 
tested represented successively larger bundles of services.  This design permitted researchers to 
draw contrasts between the three treatment groups themselves as well as between the treatment 
groups and the single control group.   
 
 Claimants assigned to the control group were given the customary work test, which 
involved informing claimants that ES registration was required but involved no systematic 
monitoring of this requirement.  The three treatments in Charleston were as follows: 
 
 1. A strengthened work test, requiring that an ES registration notice be sent after the 
first UI benefit check was paid. Payment of the second check would be suspended for failure to 
register with the ES.  This measure required establishment of improved data-sharing systems 
between UI and ES. 
 2. A strengthened work test, plus enhanced placement services, including a personal 
placement interview within one week of the first UI check, a job referral or an outreach attempt 
to contact a prospective employer (job development), and training in using the job vacancy 
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listings.  Treatment-assigned claimants were also told they would be called for special services 
again once they drew nine weeks of benefits.   
 3. A strengthened work test, enhanced placement services, plus job search 
workshops that included a three-hour workshop and, after four weeks of UI benefits, a workshop 
on labor market information. 
 
 The strengthened work test had the greatest impact.  It alone shortened the duration of 
compensated joblessness by more than half a week; the impact estimate was −0.55 weeks of UI 
benefits.  This effect was statistically significant, but not significantly different from the 
estimated effect of the second treatment.  The addition of enhanced placement services resulted 
in an impact estimate of −0.61 weeks, or an insignificant increase over the strengthened work 
test alone.  The impact estimate for the third treatment, which added job search workshops, was 
−0.76 weeks of UI benefits, a modest incremental effect over either of the other treatments.   
 
 Impacts of the treatments were concentrated among men who averaged impacts of greater 
than −1.0 weeks for all treatments, and among workers in the construction industry, who had 
impacts of over −4.0 weeks.  The relatively low cost of treatments resulted in jaw-dropping 
benefit-cost ratios in excess of 4.  That is, more than four dollars in UI benefit payments were 
saved for every dollar spent on the work test, JSA, and job search workshop services.  The third 
treatment, which involved the largest number of components, had an average cost of only $17.58 




   In 1969, the UI trust fund was added to the federal unified budget.  Conservation of UI 
funds consequently improved the overall budget picture.  In the 1980s political environment of 
huge federal deficits, the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test Experiment drew 
attention to the strengthened work test, JSA, and job search workshops as appealing policy tools.  
These instruments offered the potential of providing positive services while conserving UI trust 
fund dollars. 
 
Washington Alternative Work Search Experiment 
 
 Effects of the UI work test and related services of the public labor exchange were further 
investigated by a field experiment with random assignment between July 1986 and August 1987 
in Tacoma, Washington, job service centers.  A total of 6,763 UI claimants were assigned to one 
of three treatments, and 2,871 claimants were assigned to the control group, which followed the 
existing Washington state work search policy.   
 
 The standard work search rule required three employer contacts per week plus an 
eligibility review interview 13 to 15 weeks after the initial claim was filed.  This eligibility 
review interview involved a one-hour group session followed by a 15-minute individual 
interview.  The focus of both sessions was on UI eligibility.  The three treatments in Tacoma 
were as follows: 
 
1. Exception reporting—elimination of the UI work test.  Claimants were not 
required to file the standard biweekly continued UI claim form, and they were 
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told that UI payments would continue until the claimant voluntarily reported a 
change in employment circumstances, such as return to work or an increased level 
of earnings.   
2. New work search policy—individualized work search requirements, including a 
group eligibility review interview followed by an intensive one-on-one follow-up 
interview.   
3. Intensive services—individualized work search requirements (Treatment 2), plus 
a two-day job search workshop after four weeks (two days of classroom 
instruction plus 10 hours of phone canvassing), plus a group eligibility review 
interview after 12 weeks with a focus on employability development, plus 
individual follow-up. 
 
 Suspension of enrollment into the first treatment was done earlier than planned because 
the larger-than-expected response could easily be detected with a sample much smaller than 
designed.  Claimants relieved of the work test and continued claim filing were estimated to have 
increased their receipt of UI benefits by 3.34 weeks—a statistically significant effect.  This 
impact was bigger for women with children and men without children, and for married women 
and unmarried men.  
 
 The new work search policy, which provided custom-tailored services and schedules, had 
the effect on UI benefit receipt of adding 0.17 weeks and was statistically indistinguishable from 




 Treatment 3, which was customized and had a job search workshop after four weeks and 
an eligibility review interview after 12 weeks, had a statistically significant impact of −0.47 
weeks.  Impacts were bigger for women without children and unmarried women.  An analysis of 
the timing of the components of this treatment and claimant response (at 4 and 12 weeks) was 
combined with analysis of the timing of the standard treatment given the control group (at 13 to 
15 weeks) and response to that analysis. This combination provided new insight into claimant 
behavior.  In both cases, it was more likely for beneficiaries to stop UI receipt before a scheduled 
intervention, rather than after the service was provided.  Such a response might be termed an 
“invitation effect.”   
 
 This led to the conclusion that the timed elements of the work test—job search workshop 
and eligibility review interview—acted more like a stick prodding return to work than a carrot 
providing a reward for achieving that end.  The researchers speculated that the response to 
Treatment 2 had no identifiable peaks in the timing of exit from UI receipt because the 
individually customized schedule attenuated the observed response to an invitation to have an 
eligibility review interview.   
 
 Needless to say, exception reporting was estimated to be very costly.  Individualized 
requirements generated no differential impact.  An invitation to attend either an eligibility review 
interview or a job search workshop shortens duration, with the latter having a bigger effect.  Exit 
rates are lower during and after the eligibility review interview and job search workshop, 
suggesting it is the requirement to attend rather than the value of the session that shortens 




 Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury (2015) recently examined long-term evidence from 
the Tacoma experiment by merging Washington UI program administrative data from nine 
additional years after the original one-year follow-up period.  They focused on the treatment that 
removed the work test, and they estimated that nearly all the costs were borne by the UI system 
in the year of the experimental program change.  Long-term effects averaged out to zero, but 
subgroup analysis by job separation reason yielded an important result for those permanently 
separated from jobs.  For this group, the 10-year follow-up suggested that the standard UI work 
search requirement yielded significantly faster reemployment and greater long-term employment 
stability.  Those excused from the work test got reemployed about 1.40 calendar quarters later 
and had job tenure of about 1.65 quarters shorter than the comparison group. 
 
Maryland UI Work Search Experiment 
 
 Enrollment into the Maryland UI work search experiment was conducted in six public 
labor-exchange offices around the state throughout the calendar year of 1994 (Klepinger et al. 
1998).  A combined sample of 23,758 new monetarily eligible UI claimants were enrolled into 
the experiment.  
 
 The standard work search policy was given to the control group.  This requires two job-
search contacts per week, which must be reported on the biweekly UI continued claim form but 




1. Report four weekly employer contacts, which are not verified. 
2. Contact two employers per week, but claimants need not report the two contacted. 
3. Report two weekly employer contacts, which are not verified, plus attend a four-
day job search workshop early in the unemployment spell. 
4. Report two weekly employer contacts, plus claimants are told contacts would be 
verified.  
 
 Requiring four employer contacts per week yielded a statistically significant impact of 
−0.7 weeks of UI benefits.  This reduction in duration resulted even in the absence of any 
verification of the offers.  Requiring two employer contacts per week but removing the 
requirement to report the two contacts resulted in a statistically significant increase in UI benefit 
durations of 0.4 weeks.  The impact of requiring two employer contacts per week, which were 
not verified, plus attendance at a four-day job search workshop early in the unemployment spell, 
was −0.6 weeks of UI.  As in the Tacoma experiment, this impact was due to increasing the 
hassle associated with staying on UI, not to increasing claimants’ job search skills.  Notably for 
employers, this third treatment also reduced the probability of a claimant’s returning to his or her 
previous employer.   
 
 Requiring reporting of two employer contacts, plus telling claimants that their two 
contacts would be verified, shortened UI benefits by 0.9 weeks.  Conducting verification at a rate 
of 10 percent appeared to suffice as an adequate threat.  Notably, the impact of this fourth 
treatment occurred during the first spell of joblessness.  Similarly, the first treatment generated 
the bulk of its response during the first spell of joblessness in the benefit year.  The effects of 
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Treatments 1, 3, and 4 were not associated with lower reemployment earnings.  However, 
eliminating the work-search reporting requirement, as in Treatment 2, raises reemployment 
earnings by a statistically significant 4 percent.   
 
 A second control group facing the standard work test was also tracked, but claimants 
assigned to this group were told that their behavior was being tracked as part of an experiment.  
This was done to permit testing for the presence of a Hawthorne effect.  This is relevant in 
ensuring external validity of the evaluation.  If part of the treatment response to a new work test 
is simply due to added attention on the work test, then such an effect could quickly dissipate after 
actual implementation.  Impact estimates computed as a contrast between the participant group 
and each of the two control groups were virtually identical, suggesting the absence of any 
Hawthorne effect.12 
 
Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia Benefit-Rights Interviews Experiment 
 
 Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschênes (2005) conducted a field experiment on work 
search activity by UI claimants in four states.  The control group followed the regular procedure 
for UI applicants in the states of Connecticut, Tennessee, Massachusetts, and Virginia.  The 
procedure specified that applicants must apply in person for UI at public employment offices.  
To be initially eligible, applicants must demonstrate labor force attachment by sufficient recent 
                                                 
12 A 1987 employment service reform in the United Kingdom called “Restart” was evaluated by Dolton and O’Neill 
(1996, 2002).  They found evidence that, over the short term, requiring JSA appears to act as a stick, prodding UC 
beneficiaries back to work, but over the long term an earlier JSA intervention supports higher success in the labor 




earnings and show that their job separation was involuntary.  Claimants also were given three 
additional eligibility requirements: 1) a benefit rights interview, in which a staff member 
explained the continuing work search requirements; 2) a requirement to visit the office two 
weeks after UI application to learn of their initial eligibility; and 3) a requirement to report on 
their active work search since application.   
 
 The experiment included two treatment groups.  For both groups, the first office visit 
included an enhanced benefit rights interview that involved immediate telephone verification 
with the previous employer about the reason for job separation, thorough immediate checking of 
prior earnings through administrative wage records or applicant-provided pay stubs, and 
additional information about the requirements for continuing an active job search.  During the 
second office visit, the first treatment group (which received 40 percent of all treatments) had 
their reported employer job search contacts validated by telephone with employers, while the 
second treatment group (which received 60 percent of all treatments) did not.  The second group 
received only the standard continuing eligibility review that was also given to the first treatment 
group and the control group during their second office visit.  
 
 There were about 1,900 experimental subjects and the same number of controls. No 
treatment impacts in the individual states were statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. In data pooled across the four states, the combined treatment claimant groups 
showed a statistically significant 5 percent decrease in the likelihood of qualifying for benefits in 
the first week.  However, there were no statistically significant effects on benefit amounts or 
duration, once qualified. The authors concluded that the results of this experiment failed to 
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confirm the benefits of stricter continuing work-search enforcement. Nonetheless, the results 
highlight the value of properly checking initial eligibility.   
 
Michigan Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment Nudge 
 
The high unemployment levels and long durations of UI receipt occurring in the 1975 
recession led the U.S. Department of Labor to renew its emphasis on active job search by UI 
beneficiaries.  Guidelines for an eligibility review program were issued by USDOL to all state 
employment security agencies in 1976, and beginning in 1977 states were allotted funds for 
operating eligibility review programs.  The eligibility review programs required states to do two 
things: 1) continuously review whether UI beneficiaries had satisfied the requirements for being 
able, available, and actively seeking work, and 2) actively promote reemployment of UI 
beneficiaries with services.  Over time, the use of eligibility review programs dwindled in many 
states, along with federal funding for staff to provide services.   
 
In 2005, USDOL renewed and expanded the concept of eligibility review programs by 
providing $30 million in funding, divided among 21 states, to provide reemployment and 
eligibility assessment (REA) grants.  The REA program requires that UI beneficiaries must 
report in person to a One-Stop Career Center for staff-assisted services, and that those 
assessments must include four elements: 1) a review of continued eligibility and referral to 
adjudication if a potential issue is identified, 2) the provision of labor market information, 3) 
development or review of a work search plan, and 4) a referral to employment services, or to 
occupational or skills training when appropriate.  Nine of the 21 REA states were selected to 
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participate in a quasi-experimental evaluation. In the end, only data from Minnesota were 
sufficient for a reliable evaluation study.  The Minnesota data suggested that the REA program 
reduced the duration of UI benefit receipt by 1.2 weeks (Benus, Poe-Yamagata, et al. 2008a).  A 
follow-up evaluation involving random trials in Nevada provided evidence that the REA 
reemployment services were effective (Michaelides et al. 2012).  Funding to states for REA has 
risen steadily, from $50 million in 2009 to $68.7 million in 2014. 
 
 The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research worked with Mathematica and 
Ideas42 on a random assignment experiment evaluating an additional feature of REAs for 
unemployment insurance (UI) beneficiaries in the four-county workforce development area 
administered by Michigan Works! Southwest, a One-Stop agency affiliated with the Upjohn 
Institute.  The U.S. Department of Labor recently awarded Michigan funding for REA activities 
in five Michigan workforce areas, including Michigan Works! Southwest, which covers the 
counties of Kalamazoo, St. Joseph, Branch, and Calhoun.  The core REA is a call-in program in 
which continuing UI beneficiaries call in to validate that they are satisfying work-search 
eligibility requirements, and so the agency can provide them with additional reemployment 
services.  Failure to schedule and complete an REA interview results in suspension of UI weekly 
benefits. 
 
The Michigan REA started in January 2015, and random assignment for the experiment 
in the Michigan Works! Southwest counties began in March 2016.  Before random assignment, 
only about half of REA-assigned beneficiaries were completing REA.  Randomly assigned REA 
beneficiaries in southwest Michigan were given additional nudges designed on principles of 
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behavioral economics (Babcock et al. 2010).  The nudges took the form of a series of e-mails 
providing information and reminders to participate in REA services.  The nudges reminded REA 
beneficiaries about three required REA appointments.  A follow-up set of three “persistence” 
e-mails was also sent to encourage and reinforce job search activity after the third REA visit to a 
Michigan Works! office.  The persistence e-mails provided links to office locations and phone 
numbers, schedules of local services, and testimonials from previous service recipients.13  
Interventions were delivered to the treatment sample from March to September 2015.   
 
Part of the standard Michigan UI work test is registering online with the ES system.  That 
requires entering a personal e-mail address, and those addresses were linked to the weekly REA 
list to operationalize the random trials.  The actual sample inflow for randomization was smaller 
than the expected 40 new participants per week in just Kalamazoo.  Since the workforce area 
also included Battle Creek, Coldwater, and St. Joseph, those areas were added to yield a total of 
about 40 new REA referrals weekly by the end of the experiment.  The study found that “UI 
claimants who were sent email messages were more likely to start the REA program by 
scheduling their first session.  UI claimants who received email messages were also more likely 
to complete the REA program.  Once individuals attended their first REA session, they were 
equally likely to complete the program regardless of whether they had received emails or not” 
(Darling et al. 2016, p. 1). 
 
Targeted Job Search Assistance 
 
                                                 
13 Only one recipient of a persistence nudge e-mail opted out of the reminder and reinforcement service. 
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 Targeting of JSA surfaced as a policy option during the 1990s, following the massive 
economic restructuring and worker dislocation of the previous decade.  Earlier research had 
identified JSA as a cost-effective tool for promoting return to work.  The question of whether 
JSA would be effective for those at risk of long-term unemployment was evaluated in the context 
of a major field experiment in New Jersey (Corson et al. 1989).  Together with earlier evidence 
on JSA cost effectiveness, results from the New Jersey experiment supported establishment of 
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system, which required targeted JSA 
(Wandner 1994).   
 
 Two subsequent experiments have evaluated the effectiveness of targeted JSA.  The first 
was undertaken around the time of WPRS start-up, with special accommodations made to ensure 
experimental integrity (Decker et al. 2000).  The other evaluation, which involved randomization 
at the margin, was done in the context of the operating WPRS program in Kentucky 
(Black et al. 2003).  In this section, we briefly review the design and findings of these studies.  A 
summary of results is given in Table 3.  
  
New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment 
 
 Enrollment in the New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment was done between July 
1986 and June 1987 (Corson et al. 1989).  The sampling frame for random assignment was 
calibrated to target the evaluation to dislocated workers claiming UI benefits.  Characteristics 




 These conditions required that a claimant must do these five things: 1) receive a first UI 
payment, which must occur within five weeks of applying for benefits; 2) be at least 25 years of 
age; 3) have worked for the pre-UI claim employer for at least three years; 4) not be on standby 
awaiting return to the claimant’s previous job with a specific recall date; and 5) not be a union 
hiring hall member.   
 
 The first three of these eligibility conditions permitted the offer of an intervention early in 
the jobless spell; the second two out of the these first three ensured that subjects of the 
experiment were well-established labor force members separated from a long job attachment; 
and the last two conditions provided the potential for interventions to affect job search plans.  
Claimants who are awaiting recall to their previous job and members of union hiring halls are not 
required by the UI system to engage in active job search.  
 
 Random assignment sent 2,385 claimants to the control group and 8,675 to one of three 
treatment groups.  All three treatments included JSA, the first consisting of JSA alone.  The 
second treatment added job training to JSA.14  The third treatment added a cash reemployment 
bonus to JSA.  The bonus was for reemployment within 11 weeks of the claim and was a cash 
payment of half the remaining UI entitlement, with the initial offer good for two weeks and then 
declining by 10 percent per week.  The bonus was not paid if return to work was a recall, or if 
the job was temporary, seasonal, part-time or with a relative.  For all three treatment groups, at 
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five weeks into the claim all treatments had been given: JSA orientation, skills and aptitude 
testing, JSA workshop, and an assessment or counseling interview. 
 
 During the benefit year, the weeks of UI benefit receipt declined by −0.47, −0.48, and 
−0.97 for the three treatments, respectively.  All of these impact estimates carried statistical 
significance.  The cumulative impacts on weeks of UI benefit receipt over the six years after the 
initial benefit claim were −0.76, −0.93, and −1.72 for the three treatments, and the estimated 
impact from the third treatment was statistically significant (Corson and Haimson 1995).   
 
 The New Jersey UI Reemployment Experiment demonstrated that JSA targeted to 
claimants likely to be long-term unemployed had the same cost-effective impact as that found for 
other groups of UI claimants—about half a week shorter UI receipt.  The encouraging results for 
the bonus treatment led the U.S. Department of Labor to further investigate the ideal design for a 
reemployment bonus offer (Decker and O’Leary 1995).   
 
D.C. and Florida Job Search Assistance Experiment 
 
 The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 authorized the U.S. 
Department of Labor to conduct the Job Search Assistance Experiment.  The experiment was 
designed to evaluate whether providing early JSA to claimants identified by statistical models as 
likely to exhaust their UI benefit entitlement would be cost effective (Decker et al. 2000).  
During the planning stages of the evaluation, which was to be run in the District of Columbia and 




 In 1993, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-152, which required state employment 
security agencies to establish and use a system of profiling all new claimants for regular UI 
benefits.  The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system was intended to 
identify UI claimants who are most likely to exhaust their regular benefits, so they may be 
provided early reemployment services to make a faster transition to new employment.   
 
 The WPRS established a two-stage process.  First, UI recipients who are expecting recall 
or who are members of a union hall are dropped.  These groups are excluded because they are 
not expected to undertake an active independent job search.  Second, remaining UI recipients are 
ranked by their likelihood of exhausting regular unemployment insurance benefits.  Beneficiaries 
are then referred to early reemployment services in the order of their profiling score until the 
capacity of local agencies to serve them is exhausted.   
 
 The JSA experiment proceeded with enrollment in Florida between March 1995 and 
March 1996 in 10 sites around the state where regular WPRS operations were temporarily 
delayed.  Random assignment in Florida involved 8,071 claimants.  In Washington, DC, the 
experiment counted as the federal district’s WPRS implementation.  Random assignment 
enrollment to the JSA experiment was done in all public labor exchange offices throughout the 
District between June 1995 and June 1996, and involved 12,042 claimants.     
 
 The JSA experiment established an eligible pool of claimants using a two-stage process: 
1) exclude job-attached and union hiring hall members, then 2) evaluate the probability of 
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exhausting UI entitlement and target those with the highest probabilities for the evaluation.  
These claimants were randomly assigned to the control group or one of three treatment groups.  
There were three treatments: 
 
 1. Structured job search assistance (SJSA): orientation, testing, job search workshop, 
one-on-one assessment interview.  Failure to participate could result in denial of UI benefits.  
Two additional visits with staff to report job search progress. 
 2. Individualized job search assistance (IJSA): orientation and one-on-one 
assessment interview.  Individual plan is developed which may include additional mandatory 
services. 
 3. Individualized job search assistance with training (IJSA+): identical to IJSA, plus 
a coordinated effort with Economically Dislocated Worker Adjustment Act staff to enroll the 
customer in training.  
 
 The impacts of the three treatments on weeks of UI compensation in the benefit year in 
Washington, D.C., were −1.13, −0.47, and −0.61, respectively; all were estimated to have 
statistical significance.  Estimates of the same parameters in Florida were −0.41, −0.59, and 
−0.52, all of which were also statistically significant.  Both evaluations indicated that 
reemployment occurred at wage rates similar to previous levels.  The treatments had generally 
positive and significant effects on earnings in Washington, DC, but no impact on participant 




 Structured JSA emerged as the most cost-effective intervention examined.  The authors 
of the evaluation report attributed the generally larger impacts observed in Washington, D.C., to 
stricter enforcement of JSA participation requirements.  They recommended making particular 
JSA services mandatory and maintaining clear linkages between UI and ES in the new One-Stop 
environment under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA). 
 
Kentucky Targeted Reemployment Services 
 
 While Kentucky was included among the states studied in the national evaluation of 
WPRS, an independent assessment of WPRS in Kentucky based on an experimental design 
arrived at a much different conclusion.  The profiling model used in Kentucky was developed by 
economists at the Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Kentucky 
(Berger et al. 1997).  In working with the Kentucky Department for Employment Services on the 
WPRS system, they advocated a methodology for assignment to WPRS that provided ready data 
for an experimental evaluation of WPRS effectiveness. 
 
 Kentucky divides the predicted UI exhaustion distribution into 20 groups spanning 5 
percentile points each.  Every week the local WPRS capacity is reached within one of the 20 
groups.  That group is referred to as a profiling tie group.  In Kentucky, profiled WPRS 
customers within profiling tie groups are randomly assigned either to WPRS or to a control 
group.  This is viewed as an appropriate rule for referral to WPRS from a group of UI claimants 
having scores that are not statistically significantly different.  It also provides the basis for 




 From the profiling tie group, experimental and control groups were formed by the 
random trials to conduct an evaluation of the WPRS in Kentucky (Black et al. 2003).  Data were 
collected starting with the very beginning of WPRS implementation in Kentucky—from October 
1994 through June 1996.  The profiling tie groups yielded a total sample of 1,981 claimants, with 
1,236 of these assigned to mandatory WPRS job search assistance.  Compared to the total 
population of 48,002 profiled and referred Kentucky claimants in that period, the means of 
observable characteristics (age, schooling, gender, race, prior earnings, weekly benefit amount) 
for the experimental treatment group were not statistically significantly different from those in 
the control group.   
 
 The impact estimates for WPRS in Kentucky were dramatic.  On three outcomes of 
interest, the estimated impacts were −2.2 weeks of UI, −$143 UI benefits, and a $1,054 increase 
in earnings during the UI benefit year.  The difference in these estimates from the national 
WPRS evaluation were most likely due to the fact that Black et al. (2003) essentially confined 
their contrasts within profiling tie groups, thereby achieving a closer counterfactual.  The authors 
noted that the reduced duration was mainly due to no-shows for the profiling services, but it may 
be the case that these UI beneficiaries simply returned to work earlier.  On the other hand, 
Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer (2002) and Dickinson et al. (1999) compared those assigned to 
WPRS who had the highest probability of benefit exhaustion against all those profiled but not 
referred, including many with very low exhaustion probabilities.  This meant the comparison 
group in the national evaluation was likely to have shorter mean benefit durations than program 




 The extraordinary foresight of the Kentucky Department of Employment Services to 
include randomization in assignment to WPRS should be a model for all state and local 
Employment Service delivery agencies.  In setting up WPRS administrative rules, the Kentucky 
agency realized the value of evaluation research and used that orientation to help resolve the 
resource allocation problem.  When resources are limited, randomization in program assignment 
can always be viewed as an equitable mechanism.  It has the added benefit of providing for 




  Field experiments to induce hiring, job creation, self-employment, or job retention are 
summarized in this section, including the Dayton wage subsidy experiment; the Illinois UI 
employer incentive experiment; the Washington and Massachusetts UI self-employment 
experiments; project GATE (Growing America Through Entrepreneurship) to assist 
entrepreneurs in Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania; and the work-sharing experiment in Iowa 
and Oregon.  A summary of design elements and results from these evaluations is given in 
Tables 4 and 5. 
 
 In standard usage, a wage subsidy is a payment directly to an employer to partially offset 
the wage costs for a newly hired employee, while a wage supplement means a payment directly 
to a worker.  There is much less evidence about the latter, but results pertaining to the wage 
subsidy suggest a supplement may be more effective (Card and Robins 1998).  The main appeal 
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of the wage supplement is that it is unlikely to create the type of stigma that employers may 
attribute to workers for whom they receive wage subsidies.  The importance of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) may be largely that it is paid directly to working families without any 
employer knowledge. 
 
 Among the four tests of wage subsidies in the United States, two operated as government 
programs run through the tax system and two worked as voucher experiments.  During the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the New Jobs Tax Credit (NJTC) and the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit 
(TJTC) allowed employers to reduce tax payments by a fraction of the amount paid to workers 
hired under the programs.  Hamermesh and Rees (1984) report that NJTC subsidies were drawn 
for one-third of all the new jobs created during the period it was in effect.  However, Perloff and 
Wachter (1979) estimate that the NJTC resulted in just 3 percent more jobs than would have 
been created without the program.  The TJTC was intended to increase employment among 
certain targeted disadvantaged groups.   Hollenbeck and Wilke (1991) found that the TJTC 
increased labor market success of “nonwhite male youth, but is stigmatizing for eligible 
individuals from other race/sex groups.”  This finding that a wage subsidy acts as a stigma also 
emerged from the experimental studies.  
 
Dayton Wage Subsidy Experiment 
 
 A targeted wage subsidy was operated as a field experiment with random trials in 1980–
1981 by the U.S. Department of Labor in Dayton, Ohio.  The evaluation involved two 
treatments: 1) a hiring tax credit (with 247 in the sample) and 2) a lump-sum cash subsidy 
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payment (299 in the sample), plus a control group (sample size of 262) of otherwise similar 
employers.  Burtless (1985, p. 106) writes that “the results show conclusively that workers 
known to be eligible for targeted wage subsidies were significantly less likely to find jobs than 
were otherwise identical workers whose eligibility for subsidies was not advertised.”  Burtless 
(1985, p. 105) speculates that “the vouchers had a stigmatizing effect and provided a screening 
device with which employers discriminated against economically disadvantaged workers.”  
 
Illinois UI Hiring Incentive Experiment 
 
 Another experiment testing an intervention that amounted to a wage subsidy was not 
restricted to economically disadvantaged workers but may have also stigmatized job seekers.  
Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987) report that for the Illinois Reemployment Bonus Experiment, 
cash bonuses paid directly to persons who gain reemployment have a powerful effect in reducing 
the duration of unemployment, while if a cash payment for hiring a job seeker is made to 
employers, the effect is almost nil.  Employers may be reluctant to hire workers who present a 
voucher for payment from the state because it signals that the workers may have “hidden” 
characteristics that hinder their finding employment without a state subsidy. 
 
 Most programs for the unemployed are either income-support or labor-supply enhancing; 
the wage subsidy is a labor-demand stimulus.  But apparently regardless of the form of delivery 
of the subsidy to employers, it has a stigmatizing effect on workers.  An obvious alternative is 
the wage supplement, which is paid directly to workers.  This type of program has even been 
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recommended to help welfare recipients (who might face the most severe stigma) gain 
reemployment.15 
 
Washington and Massachusetts UI Self-Employment Experiments 
 
 Self-employment initiatives for unemployed persons have been operating in Europe since 
1979.16  Seventeen countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have programs patterned after either the French model, which grants a 
lump sum to the unemployed who plan to become self-employed, or the British model, which 
gives a series of periodic support payments during the start-up phase of self-employment.17  The 
British model amounts to a waiver of the work search requirements for continued receipt of 
periodic unemployment compensation payments.  American experiments tested the French 
model in Washington State and the British model in Massachusetts (Benus et al. 1995). 
 
Self-employment assistance in Massachusetts was assessed by randomized controlled 
trials between 1990 and 1993.  The treatment group increased self-employment, reduced the 
length of their unemployment, and increased their total time in employment—including self-
employment plus wage and salary employment.  The experiment also had a substantial positive 
impact on participants’ earnings.  In a benefit-cost framework, self-employment assistance was 
estimated to be cost effective for project participants, society as a whole, and the government 
                                                 
15See for example Lerman (1985). 
16Background information on the European experience with and the American experiments in self-employment for 
unemployed persons can be found in Wandner (1994). 
 17The French model is followed in Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, while the British model is 
used in Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. 
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sector as well.  Overall, the self-employment assistance provided in the demonstration 
significantly increased participants’ total time in employment (i.e., the combination of self-
employment and wage and salary employment) after being randomly assigned to the project.  
Including time spent in self-employment and wage and salary employment, participants were 
employed 1.9 months longer than the control group.  Total earnings of the average project 
participant increased by $5,940 over the amount earned by the average control-group member 
over the three-year follow-up period.  
 
The Washington UI Self-Employment Demonstration (SEED) involved random-
assignment enrollment to treatment and control groups in Washington State between September 
1989 and September 1990, with business services available for participants through March 1991 
(Benus et al. 1995). A total of 755 new claimants were enrolled in SEED at the six sites and were 
offered demonstration services; 752 new claimants who applied to SEED were assigned to the 
control group. The SEED treatment followed the French-style lump-sum payment method, with 
the offer being the remainder of a UI beneficiary’s entitlement at the start of self-employment 
efforts along with business start-up and development efforts.  The first Washington telephone 
survey was conducted, on average, 21 months after random assignment. 
 
Only about 4 percent of targeted Washington UI claimants met the initial eligibility 
requirements of attending an orientation and submitting an application. Compared to the control 
group, treatments achieved the following 10 things: 1) spent about 4.0 months more in 
self-employment; 2) earned more than control subjects from self-employment during the follow-
up period; 3) had reduced likelihood of wage and salary employment; 4) spent about one month 
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less in wage and salary employment; 5) earned significantly less from wage and salary 
employment; 6) had similar earnings from wage and salary and self-employment during the 
observation period; 7) had higher rates of employment; 8) reduced the length of the first 
unemployment spell; 9) excluding the lump-sum payment, had reduced UI benefit receipt during 
the first benefit year; 10) including the lump-sum payment, had higher total UI payments during 
the first benefit year.  
 
Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania Entrepreneurship Experiment 
 
Growing America Through Entrepreneurship (GATE) studied the value of helping new 
entrepreneurs start and expand their own small businesses (Benus, McConnell, et al. 2008).  
Enrollment was done in state employment offices or kiosks between Fall 2003 and Summer 2005 
in seven sites in Maine, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.  In the end, only data from Minnesota was 
sufficient for analysis.  GATE offered three services: 1) individual assessment session; 2) 
training in general business, in legal and personnel issues, and in business accounting computer 
software; and 3) individual meetings with business counselors about business plans and loan 
applications.  A total of 4,198 Minnesota GATE applicants were randomly assigned to either the 
treatment or the control group. The response rate to the follow-up survey was 82 percent at 18 
months after enrollment.  Survey data were merged with administrative records on UI payments 
and quarterly wage records covering the 12 months before and after random assignment.  
 
Project GATE generated a small but significant impact on business ownership in the 18-
month follow-up.  By the third quarter after random assignment, 43 percent of the program group 
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reported owning a business, a statistically significant 6 percentage points more than the 
comparison group.  The advantage for participants dwindled to 3 percentage points (statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level) at the 18-month follow-up.  There were no significant effects on 
total employment with rates (self-employment plus wage and salary employment) at about 70 
percent in the first quarter after random assignment and 85 percent eighteen months after random 
assignment. However, compared to the control group, GATE participants were more likely to be 
self-employed and less likely to be employed in wage and salary jobs.  
 
Control-group members earned slightly more than participants from wage and salary 
jobs, and about the same through self-employment, so that GATE participants earned somewhat 
less during the 18-month follow-up.  The wage and salary difference was $1,800 based on the 
survey, but only $200 less based on UI quarterly wage records (not statistically significant).  
Both groups earned about $6,000 over the 18-month follow-up period.  GATE increased receipt 
of UI benefits by about one week, or about $340 per person for all participants, and by about 
$605 for those already receiving UI benefits when they applied to GATE.  There were no 
program impacts on the receipt of public assistance or other income. 
 
Overall, results from the GATE study suggest the following things:  
• Self-employment services can be effectively offered at One-Stop Career Centers. 
•  Increased business ownership might not lead to increased self-employment earnings 
in the short run.  




• Self-employment programs improve outcomes for UI recipients more than others.   
 
Iowa and Oregon Work-Sharing Experiments 
 
 Short-time compensation (STC), commonly known as work sharing, is one of the very 
few public employment policies to directly support labor demand.18  Under STC, work 
reductions are shared among employees by reducing work hours instead of laying off some 
workers.  The STC program partially replaces lost earnings by paying a percentage of the entitled 
UI weekly benefit amount equal to the percentage reduction in weekly work hours.  Currently, 
28 states have STC plans, and in those states STC is used relatively infrequently compared to 
regular UI (Balducchi 2015).  The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 had 
features promoting STC in the states, including temporary reimbursement by the federal 
government to states of STC benefits paid for three years (PL 112-96, Title III, Subtitle D).  If 
STC were available in all states, in recession periods it could be used as a channel of fiscal 
policy by supplementing emergency federal extended unemployment benefits.  A field 
experiment started in 2014 aimed to identify effective strategies to promote broader employer 
use of STC.   
 
 The experiment involved randomized controlled trials in Iowa and Oregon designed to 
increase employer awareness and adoption of STC in lieu of temporary layoffs, and thereby 
reduce regular UI claims and weeks of UI compensation. The evaluation sought to answer 
research questions about 1) program awareness and interest, 2) program use, 3) costs, and 4) 
                                                 
18
 This summary is adapted from the evaluation design report (Houseman et al. 2017).   
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other lessons.  The federal reimbursement feature was part of the Iowa treatments, but not the 
Oregon treatments.  However, because the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 
required that benefit charges from STC and regular UI be treated the same, the new law affected 
the UI tax treatment of many Oregon employers with prior STC experience. 
 
 Before the experiment began, the only posted STC program information generally 
available to Iowa employers was one brief section in the UI employer handbook. The researchers 
worked with Iowa state officials to create a webpage and to develop informational materials, 
including a brochure, fact sheet, and list of frequently asked questions about STC.  Stratified 
random assignment to treatment and control groups was done for Iowa employers with more than 
five employees.  Sampling strata were defined by employment size, UI claims history, industry, 
and location.  Treatment-group employers were given program information and directed to the 
program staff and website by a series of postal mailings.  The Iowa interventions were delivered 
over 12 months starting September 2014 and involved two mass mailings to all treatments in 
September 2014 and May 2015, an insert with the annual tax rate notice that is mailed out in 
November, and quarterly mailings to treatment employers who had UI claims against them in the 
previous calendar quarter.19  The offer of federal reimbursement for STC benefits was available 
up until February 22, 2015.  When the experiment started in September 2014, only 14 STC plans 
were operating in Iowa.   
 
 Before the experiment, Oregon had relatively well-developed materials on STC, but had 
not systematically advertised the program to employers.  As with Iowa, the researchers worked 
                                                 
19
 There was an error in the tax rate notice STC insert that contaminated about 20 percent of the control group and 
delayed the mailing by two months to 80 percent of the treatment group. 
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with the state to improve and update these informational materials. In the Portland metropolitan 
area, an RCT design similar to that in Iowa was implemented, and a quasi-experimental design 
evaluation was implemented in the balance of the state.20  During the design phase for the 
experiment, USDOL set up a technical work group of advisers for the study, including social 
scientists and state and federal practitioners.  One recommendation from the technical work 
group to increase employer usage of STC was not amenable to an RCT evaluation:  the work 
group recommended a cultural change to saturate the environment with information about STC 
on mass media and public announcements made through political channels, business and 
community organizations, and employee groups.   
 
 In the Portland metropolitan area, as in Iowa, the researchers constructed a stratified 
sample of all employers and randomly assigned them to treatment and control groups.  It was 
judged that the Portland metro area had enough users of UI and STC that the sample size would 
be sufficient to permit estimation of statistically significant effects big enough to be of policy 
interest.  The Oregon Employment Department divides the state into 15 state Worksource 
Regions for the purposes of delivering services. The quasi-experimental design used Worksource 
Regions located outside of the Portland metro area as the basis for employer assignment: all 
employers located in one set of Worksource Regions were given interventions, while all 
employers located in the other set were not. These were referred to as the “treatment” region and 
                                                 
20
The Portland area alone has nearly as many STC-eligible employers as the whole state of Iowa.  The Iowa RCT 
involved about 14,000 employers in the treatment and control groups, while in Oregon the count was about 10,000 
in each group. 
45 
 
the “comparison” region, respectively.21  As in Iowa, the Oregon interventions were 
administered for a one-year period.  In Oregon, the treatment period started in late October 2014.   
 
 Use of STC by Iowa employers did not change appreciably after the interventions began, 
but in regression models controlling for observable characteristics, there was a small but 
significant increase in starting new STC plans by employers in the treatment group.  
Furthermore, the pattern of weekly STC payments in Iowa suggests that employers tried to take 
advantage of temporary federal payment of STC benefits.  The informational efforts had positive 
and significant effects in Oregon, and there was some evidence that employers with prior STC 
experience may have started new plans in response to the information.  Part of the response by 
experienced STC employers may have resulted from the news that STC payments in Oregon 
would affect employer UI tax rates the same as regular UI payments. 
 
Summary and Relevance to UI Today 
 
 As social insurance, UI pays compensation to labor force members who are involuntarily 
separated from their jobs while they are actively seeking work.  The program embodies elements 
of both private insurance and social assistance.  While benefit levels are related to prior earnings, 
they do not completely replace lost earnings, but pay an amount that is directly related to prior 
wage levels up to a socially determined adequate weekly maximum.  The elements most 
                                                 
21
 Following Bloom (2000), the minimum detectable effect in the Oregon QED evaluation will be larger than in the 
RCT evaluation by a factor approximated by the square root of [1/(1-R2A)], where, R2A is the coefficient of 
determination from the regression of the QED treatment indicator on characteristics of employers in the treatment 
and control samples. 
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reflecting private insurance principles involve using work-search requirements to test initial and 
continuing eligibility for benefits.   
 
 Research in the 1970s recognized the moral hazard risks of work disincentives resulting 
from paying UI benefits and estimated the effects to be between 0.5 and 1.5 weeks for a 10 
percent increase in the wage replacement rate.  This work led to a series of UI-related field 
experiments to identify improved administrative practices and incentives to control system costs 
and improve beneficiary outcomes.  The reemployment bonus experiments in the 1980s 
estimated that offers would reduce UI durations by an average 0.5 week and be modestly cost 
effective.  Simulations based on the bonus experiments found that a bonus amount smaller than 
the average, when tested and targeted to the half of UI-eligible beneficiaries who are most likely 
to exhaust UI, achieved a 0.5 week reduction more cost effectively.  Field experiments 
estimating the effects of strengthening UI work-search requirements estimated duration 
reductions between 0.5 and 1.0 week.  An experiment removing the work test saw durations 
jump by 3.3 weeks.  The UI work test involves connecting the unemployed to job search 
assistance.  Experimental evaluations of targeted job search assistance estimated that durations 
were shortened by between 0.5 and 2.2 weeks.   
 
 Field experiments evaluating hiring incentives offered to employers have generally not 
found cost-effective policy options, mainly because of low employer take-up.  However, some 
smaller UI programs show promise as labor demand policies—particularly when properly 
targeted.  Field experiments that paid UI as self-employment assistance with a work-search 
waiver during the business start-up phase, and targeted to those most likely to exhaust UI, were 
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found to be cost-neutral to the UI system and often lead to second-order employment effects 
though hiring.  Work sharing, or short-time compensation (STC), which pays employees a 
fraction of their weekly UI equal to the proportionate reduction in work hours, can help 
employers control layoff costs and retain talent during business downturns.  A recent field 
experiment suggests employers will sometimes use STC instead of layoffs when they know how 
STC works. 
 
 The federal-state UI program is now gradually rebuilding system reserves after the Great 
Recession.  Many states were left with billions in debt from paying regular benefits, even though 
the federal government fully paid for benefit extensions at unprecedented levels.  Some states are 
retreating from accepted standards of UI adequacy with the expectation that the federal 
government will once again intervene when an unemployment crisis emerges.  The potential 
duration of regular UI benefits is no longer at least 26 weeks in all states.  However, after welfare 
reform, all social policy is now employment policy.  Making and maintaining connections to the 
workforce is the only path to self-sufficiency.  Policymakers are looking for improvements to the 
public employment system that will be cost-neutral.  The experiments reviewed in this paper 
offer a menu for further improvements.   
 
 Active reemployment services and targeted assistance are ways to serve more workers 
within a given UI benefits budget.  Financing of services and financing of benefits have both 
been hampered by the inadequate federal taxable wage base of $7,000, which has not increased 
since 1982.  Financing of Wagner-Peyser employment services, and in many states adequate 
financing of regular UI benefits, is limited by the federal taxable wage base. In 1939, this wage 
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base matched the Social Security wage base, but the two have not remained in balance over the 
years: the latter has grown to $118,500, while the former has barely budged.  Relying on the 
recent field experiment on REAs in Nevada, the federal government is attempting to strengthen 
and expand state use of UI eligibility reviews and rejuvenate UI worker profiling.  We are now in 
a transition phase where REA is being integrated with WPRS so that job search activation and 
reemployment services are targeted to UI beneficiaries most at risk of long-term unemployment 
and benefit receipt.  As reviewed in this paper, elements of the REA/WPRS effort—now called 
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA)—have been found effective in 
field experiments.  The UI system has been weakened by financing challenges, but incremental 
improvements have often been guided by evidence from classically designed random trials.  This 
approach requires an understanding of how the system works and of the incentive and 
administrative structure.  It also requires up-front public investment for evaluation studies.  
However, the results can yield an employment security system that is a stronger part of the social 




Ashenfelter, Orley, David Ashmore, and Olivier Deschênes. 2005. “Do Unemployment 
Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Evidence from Randomized Trials in Four 
U.S. States." Journal of Econometrics 125(1–2): 53–75. 
 
Babcock, Linda, William J. Congdon, Lawrence F. Katz, and Sendhil Mullainathan.  2010. 
“Notes on Behavioral Economics and Labor Market Policy.”  Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
 
Balducchi, David E.  2015. “Selling Work Sharing in Virginia: Lessons from the Campaign to 
Enact Short-Time Compensation, 2011–2014.” In Transforming U.S. Workforce 
Development Policies for the 21st Century, Carl Van Horn, Tammy Edwards, and Todd 
Greene, eds.  Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute, pp. 543–559. 
 
Benus, Jacob M., Terry R. Johnson, Michelle Wood, Neelima Grover, and Theodore Shen. 1995. 
“Self-Employment Programs: A New Reemployment Strategy—Final Report on the UI 
Self-Employment Demonstration.” Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper No. 95-4. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor. 
 
Benus, Jacob, Sheena McConnell, Jeanne Bellotti, Theodore Shen, Kenneth Fortson, and Daver 
Kahvecioglu.  2008. “Growing America through Entrepreneurship: Findings from the 
Evaluation of Project GATE.”  Employment and Training Occasional Paper No. 2008-3.  





Benus, Jacob, Eileen Poe-Yamagata, Ying Wang, and Etan Blass.  2008. “Reemployment and 
Eligibility Assessment (REA) Study–FY 2005 Initiative: Final Report.” Employment and 
Training Occasional Paper No. 2008-02. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, 
Employment and Training Administration.   
 
 
Berger, Mark, Dan A. Black, Amitab Chandra, and Steve Allen.  1997. “Kentucky’s Statistical 
Model of Worker Profiling for Unemployment Insurance.” Kentucky Journal of Business 
and Economics 16: 1–18. 
 
Black, Dan, Jeffrey Smith, Mark Berger, and Brett Noel.  2003. “Is the Threat of Reemployment 
Services More Effective than the Services Themselves?  Evidence from Random 
Assignment in the UI System.” American Economic Review 93(4): 1313–1327.  
 
Bloom, Howard.  2000. “Sample Size and Allocation for Randomized Experiments.” Lecture 
notes for Evaluation Workshop Session No. 1 of Day 2, February 3, 2000.  New York: 
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC).   
 
Burgess, Paul L, and Jerry L. Kingston.  1987.  An Incentives Approach to Improving the 





Burtless, Gary.  1985. “Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful?  Evidence from a Wage Voucher 
Experiment.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 39(1): 105–114. 
 
Card, David, and Philip Robins. 1998. “Do Financial Incentives Encourage Welfare Recipients 
to Work? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation of the Self-Sufficiency Project.”  In  
Research in Labor Economics, Vol. 17, Solomon Polachek, ed.  Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press, pp. 1–56. 
 
Classen, Kathleen P.  1977. “The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on the Duration of 
Unemployment and Subsequent Earnings.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
30(4): 438–444. 
 
Corson, Walter, Paul T. Decker, Sherri M. Dunstan, Anne R. Gordon, Patricia Anderson, and 
John Homrighausen.  1989. “New Jersey Unemployment Insurance Reemployment 
Demonstration Project.” Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper No. 89-3.  
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 
 
Corson, Walter, and Joshua Haimson.  1995. “The New Jersey Unemployment Insurance 
Reemployment Demonstration Project Six-Year Follow-Up and Summary Report.”  UI 
Occasional Paper No. 95-2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 




Corson, Walter, David Long, and Walter Nicholson.  1985. “Evaluation of the Charleston 
Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration.” Unemployment Insurance 
Occasional Paper No. 85-2.  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment 
and Training Administration. 
 
Cox, James C., and Ronald L. Oaxaca.  1989. “Unemployment Insurance: The Worker’s 
Perspective.”  In Investing in People: A Strategy to Address America’s Workforce Crisis.  
Washington DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Commission on Workforce Quality and 
Labor Market Efficiency. 
 
Darling, Matthew, Christopher J. O’Leary, Irma Perez-Johnson, Jaclyn Lefkowitz, Ken Kline, 
Ben Damerow, and Randall W. Eberts.  2016. “Encouragement Emails Increase 
Participation in Reemployment Services.” DOL Behavioral Interventions Project Brief.  
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Chief Evaluation Officer. 
 
Davidson, Carl, and Stephen A. Woodbury.  1991. “Effects of a Reemployment Bonus under 
Differing Benefit Entitlements, or, Why the Illinois Experiment Worked.”  Unpublished 
manuscript. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University; and Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
———.  1993. “The Displacement Effect of Reemployment Bonus Programs.”  Journal of 




Decker, Paul T.  1997. “Work Incentives and Disincentives.” In Unemployment Insurance in the 
United States: Analysis of Policy Issues, Christopher J. O’Leary and Stephen A. 
Wandner, eds.  Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, pp. 
285–320.  
 
Decker, Paul T., and Christopher J. O’Leary.  1995. “Evaluating Pooled Evidence from the 
Reemployment Bonus Experiments.” Journal of Human Resources 30(3): 534–550.   
 
Decker, Paul T., Robert B. Olson, Lance Freeman, and Daniel H. Klepinger.  2000. “Assisting 
Unemployment Insurance Claimants: The Long-Term Impact of the Job Search 
Assistance Demonstration.” OWS Occasional Paper No. 2000-02.  Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Office of Workforce 
Security.  
 
Dickinson, Katherine P., Paul T. Decker, and Suzanne D. Kreutzer.  2002. “Evaluation of WPRS  
Systems.” In Targeting Employment Services, Randall W. Eberts, Christopher J. O’Leary, 
and Stephen A. Wandner, eds.  Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research, pp. 61–81.   
 
Dickinson, Katherine P., Paul T. Decker, Suzanne D. Kreutzer, and Richard W.  
West.  1999.  Evaluation of Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services: Final 
Report.  Research and Evaluation Report 99-D.  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 




Dolton, Peter, and Donal O’Neill.  1996. “Unemployment Duration and the Restart Effect.” 
Economic Journal 106 (1996): 387–400. Economic Journal 106(2): 387–400.   
 
———.  2002. “The Long-Run Effects of Unemployment Monitoring and Work-Search 
Programs: Experimental Evidence from the United Kingdom.” Journal of Labor 
Economics 20(2, Part 1): 381–403.   
 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., and Ronald Oaxaca. 1976. “Unemployment Insurance, Duration of 
Unemployment, and Subsequent Wage Gain.” American Economic Review 66(5): 754–
766. 
 
Feldstein, Martin S. 1974. “Unemployment Compensation:  Adverse Incentives and 
Distributional Anomalies.” National Tax Journal 27(2): 231–244. 
 
Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Albert Rees.  1984.  The Economics of Work and Pay. 3rd ed. 
Cambridge: Harper and Row. 
 
Heckman, James J. 1976.  “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample 
Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models,” 




Heckman, James J., Neil Hohmann, Jeffrey Smith, and Michael Khoo.  2000. “Substitution and 
Dropout Bias in Social Experiments: A Study of an Influential Social Experiment.”  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(2): 651–694. 
 
Heckman, James J., Robert J. LaLonde, and Jeffrey A. Smith.  1999. “The Economics and 
Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Vol. 3A, Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds.  Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 1865–2097. 
 
Hollenbeck, Kevin, and Richard Wilke.  1991. “The Employment and Earnings Impacts of the 
Targeted Jobs Tax Credit.” Upjohn Institute Working Paper No. 91-07.  Kalamazoo, MI: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
Houseman, Susan, Christopher J. O’Leary, Katharine G. Abraham, Frank Bennici, Susan  
Labin, and Richard Sigman. 2017. Demonstration and Evaluation of the Short-Time 
Compensation Program in Iowa and Oregon: Final Report.  Kalamazoo, MI:  W.E. 
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.   
 
Johnson, Terry R., and Daniel H. Klepinger. 1991. “Evaluation of the Impacts of the Washington 
Alternative Work Search Experiment.”  Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper No. 






———.  1994. “Experimental Evidence on Unemployment Insurance Work-Search Policies.”  
Journal of Human Resources 29(3): 695–717.   
 
Jones, Stephen R. G.  1992. “Was There a Hawthorne Effect?”  American Journal of Sociology 
98(3): 451–468.  
 
Kirby, Gretchen, Margaret Sullivan, Elizabeth Potamites, Jackie Kauff, Elizabeth Clary, and 
Charles McGlew. 2008. “Responses to Personal Reemployment Accounts (PRAs): 
Findings from the Demonstration States—Final Evaluation Report.”  ETA Occasional 
Paper No. 2008-07. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and 
Training Administration.   
 
Klepinger, Daniel H., Terry R. Johnson, Jutta. M. Joesch, and Jacob M. Benus.  1998. 
“Evaluation of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Work Search Demonstration.”  
Unemployment Insurance Occasional Paper No. 98-2.  Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 
 
Krueger, Alan B., and Bruce D. Meyer.  2002. “Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance.” 
NBER Working Paper No. 9014. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 




Lachowska, Marta, Merve Meral, and Stephen A. Woodbury. 2015. “The Effects of Eliminating 
the Work Search Requirement on Job Match Quality and Other Long-Term Employment 
Outcomes.” Washington, D.C.: Department of Labor. 
 
Lee, David S., and Thomas Lemieux. 2010. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics.” 
Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 281–355. 
 
Lerman, Robert I.  1985. “Separating Income Support from Income Supplementation.”  Journal 
of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies 10(Autumn): 101–125. 
 
Michaelides, Marios, Eileen Poe-Yamagata, Jacob Benus, and Dharmendra Tirumalasetti.  2012. 
“Impact of the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment (REA) Initiative in Nevada.” 
Employment and Training Occasional Paper No. 2012-08.  Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Labor.   
 
Meyer, Bruce D.  1995. “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments.”  
Journal of Economic Literature 33(1): 91–131. 
 
Nekoei, Arash.  2014. “Essays on Unemployment and Labor Supply.”  Doctoral dissertation.  




Oaxaca, Ronald L., and Carol A. Taylor.  1986. “Simulating the Impacts of Economic Programs 
on Urban Areas: The Case of Unemployment Insurance Benefits.” Journal of Urban 
Economics 19(1): 19–46. 
 
 
O’Leary, Christopher J., Paul T. Decker, and Stephen A. Wandner.  2005. “Cost Effectiveness of 
Targeted Reemployment Bonuses.”  Journal of Human Resources 40(1): 270–279.   
 
O’Leary, Christopher J., Robert G. Spiegelman, and Kenneth J. Kline.  1995. “Do Bonus Offers 
Shorten Unemployment Insurance Spells? Results from the Washington Reemployment 
Bonus Experiment.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 14(2): 245–269. 
 
Orr, Larry L. 1999.  Social Experiments.  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Perloff, Jeffrey M., and Michael L. Wachter.  1979. “The New Jobs Tax Credit: An Evaluation 
of the 1977–78 Wage Subsidy Program. American Economic Review 69(2): 173–179. 
 
Solon, Gary. 1985. “Work Incentive Effects of Taxing Unemployment Benefits.” Econometrica 
53(2): 295–306.  
 
Wandner, Stephen A., ed.  1994. “The Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services System: 
Legislation, Implementation Process, and Research Findings.”  UI Occasional Paper No. 
59 
 
94-4.  Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training 
Administration. 
 
———.  2012. Personal Reemployment Accounts: Mitt Romney’s Training Voucher and 
Reemployment Bonus Proposal.  Washington, DC: Urban Institute. 
 
Woodbury, Stephen A., and Robert G. Spiegelman.  1987. “Bonuses to Workers and Employers 





Table 1   Reemployment Bonus Experiments’ Impacts on Benefit-Year Weeks of UI 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Illinois 
Bonus amount Qualification period Impact estimate 




Bonus amount Qualification period Impact estimate 
Half the remaining UI entitlement, 
with the initial offer good for two 






Bonus amount  12 weeks (long) 









































NOTE: T: treatment; C: control group; JSW: job search workshop.  * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 2  Experiments on Job Search Assistance and the UI Work Test 
Authors (year published) Title Design  Sample Findings 
Corson, Long, and Nicholson 
(1985)  
Evaluation of the Charleston 
Claimant Placement and Work 
Test Demonstration 
T1: Stronger work test 
T2: T1 plus enhanced placement 
services 
T3: T2 plus Job Search Workshop 
(JSW) 





C: 1,428  
T1:  −0.55* wks. UI  
T2:  −0.61** wks. UI 
T3:  −0.76** wks. UI  
Impacts greater on men and 
construction workers. 
Johnson and Klepinger (1991, 
1994) 
Evaluation of the Impacts of 
the Washington Alternative 
Work Search Experiment 
T1: Exception reporting 
T2: New work search policy 
T3: Intensive services 
C: Existing work search policy 
Tacoma, WA, 




T1: +3.34** wks. UI 
T2: +0.17 wks. UI 
T3: −0.47* wks. UI 
Exits increased preceding required 
service participation. 
Klepinger et al.  (1998)  Evaluation of the Maryland 
Unemployment Insurance 
Work Search Demonstration 
T1: Report four employer 
contacts weekly 
T2: Two contacts required 
weekly, but no reporting 
T3: Report two contacts weekly 
plus a four-day JSW 
T4: Report two contacts weekly 
and both verified   
C1: Standard policy: report two 
contacts weekly but not verified 
C2: Standard policy, but told data 




January 1, 1994, to 
December 31, 1994; 
Combined sample, 
23,758 monetarily 
eligible new initial 
UI claimants.  
 
T1: −0.7** wks. UI  
T2: +0.4* wks. UI 
T3: −0.6** wks. UI 
T4: −0.9** wks. UI 
Impacts identical against either 
control group, suggesting no 
Hawthorne effect present. 
Treatments 1, 3, and 4 had no 
earnings impacts.   
Treatment 2 raised earnings by 4** 
percent. 
Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and 
Deschênes (2005) 
Do Unemployment Insurance 
Recipients Actively Seek 
Work? Evidence from 
Randomized Trials in Four 
U.S. States 
T1 & T2: 1st visit to verify 
eligibility and separation 
T1: 2nd visit to verify job search  
C: 1st visit std. eligibility review, 
2nd visit std. eligibility review 
Application and 
reviews in person: 
T1: 760; 
T2: 1,140;   
C: 1,900 
T1 & T2: −5% initial UI eligibility 
rate. 
T1: no statistically significant 
effect on continuing eligibility or 




Table 3   Experiments on Targeted Job Search Assistance 
Authors (year published) Title Design  Sample Findings 






T2: JSA plus training or 
relocation assistance 
T3:  JSA plus a cash bonus 
C: Eligibility: first UI 
payment, age, tenure, 
temporary layoffs, union 
New Jersey: 




T1: −0.47** wks. of UI  
T2: −0.48** wks. of UI 
T3: −0.97** wks. of UI 
6-year T1: −0.76 wks. of UI 
6-year T2: −0.93 wks. of UI 
6-year T3: −1.72** wks. of UI 
Decker et al. (2000) Assisting 
Unemployment 
Insurance Claimants: 
The Long-Term Impact 
of the Job Search 
Assistance 
Demonstration  
T1: Structured JSA  
T2: Individualized JSA  
T3: T2 plus training  
C: Not on standby or a 
union hiring hall member, 
and predicted likely to 
exhaust UI entitlement 
DC and Florida: 
DC: June 1995 
to June 1996, 
8,071 claimants. 
FL: March 1995 
to March 1996, 
12,042 
claimants. 
DC T1: −1.13** wks. of UI 
DC T2: −0.47** wks. of UI 
DC T3: −0.61** wks. of UI 
 
FL T1: −0.41** wks. of UI 
FL T2: −0.59** wks. of UI 
FL T3: −0.52** wks. of UI 
Black et al. (2003) Is the Threat of 
Reemployment 
Services More 
Effective Than the 
Services Themselves?  
Experimental Evidence 
from the UI System  
T: WPRS profiled and 
referred to early JSA 
reemployment services 
C: Profiled and in the same 
predicted UI exhaustion 
cohort as T, but not 
referred to JSA 
Kentucky: 




In the benefit year 
 
T: −2.2 weeks of UI  
T: −$143 in UI benefits 
T:  $1,054 in earnings 
   NOTE: T: experimental treatment group; P: participant group; C: experimental control group or comparison group; JSW: job search workshop. 






Table 4  Experiments on Employer Incentives 
Authors (year published) Title Design  Sample Findings 
Burtless (1985) Are Targeted Wage 
Subsidies Harmful?  
Evidence from a Wage 
Voucher Experiment 
T1: Hiring tax credit 
T2: Hiring cash subsidy 
C: No assistance 
All groups drawn from 
AFDC and general 
assistance recipients. 
Dayton, OH 





T1: −7.6% employed 
T2: −7.9% employed 
Few subsidy vouchers submitted by 
employers (27.1% of those employed).  
No impact on wage rates. 





Bonuses to Workers 
and Employers to 
Reduce 
Unemployment: 
Random Trials in 
Illinois 
T: $500 paid to the 
employer if hired within 
11 weeks of UI claim and 
continuously employed 
for four months. 
 
C: Eligible for regular UI.  
Illinois (22 Job 
Service offices), mid-
1984 to early 1985 
T: 3,963 
C: 4,186 
T: −$164 UI for white females, no impact 
on white males or blacks.  Low take-up: 
22.8% qualified for bonus, but employers 
only converted voucher to cash for 2.8% 
of treatment assigned.  
Benus et al. (1995) Self-Employment 
Programs: A New 
Reemployment 
Strategy, Final Report 
on the UI Self-
Employment 
Demonstration 
TW: lump-sum cash-out 
of UI entitlement after 
self-employment training. 
TM: UI work search 
waiver after completing 
self-employment training. 
 
C: UI-eligible, attended 
self-employment 
orientation and applied.  
WA: Sept. 1989 to 
March 1991 
TW: 755  
CW: 752 
 




TW: more self-employment, less regular 
employment, higher self-employment 
income, lower earnings from regular 
employment, net earnings gain. 
TM: more self-employment, more regular 
employment, higher earnings from both 
regular and self-employment. 
In both states, self-employment was most 
successful for educated males aged 35–55. 





Table 5   Effects of Self-Employment Assistance Programs 
Authors (year) Method Sample  Intervention Self-employed Any employment EI/UI receipt 
Benus et al. 
(1995) 








weekly UI pay with 
work search waiver 
at 19, 31 mos., 
+11%, +5% 
at 19, 31 mos.,  
+1%, −4% 
−1.8 wks. 
Benus et al. 
(1995) 








lump-sum balance of 
UI entitlement 
at 21, 33 mos., 
+16%, +12% 




McConnell, et al. 
(2008) 
RA: GATE 
participants got 13 
hours more SE 
training than 
comparison group. 
Inflow at One-Stop 
centers: 2003 to 2005; 







help with loan 
applications 
At 3 qtrs., +6%;  
at 6 qtrs., +3% 
No statistically 
significant effects, 
but more employed 
in SE than in wage 
and salary work. 
+1 wk., +2 wks. if 
on UI first 
 
 
